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Child support is a private transfer, typically from the noncustodial par-
ent to a custodial parent. Although it is neither public transfer nor means-
tested, child support is integral to the means-tested public transfer system.
Governments have come to play a major role in enforcing private support
obligations. Traditionally, in the United States, state governments and
courts exercised authority over laws governing divorce and parental ﬁnan-
cial obligations, including decisions about how much parents owe and
howto make sure parents pay their obligations. As the welfare rolls and the
number of one-parent families soared in the late 1960s and early 1970s, sev-
eral members of Congress began looking for ways both to reinstate the ﬁ-
nancial responsibility of parents and to reduce welfare costs. In 1974, Sen-
ator Russell Long, the powerful chair of the Senate Finance Committee,
convinced Congress that establishing a federally funded child support en-
forcement program was part of the solution.
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was established in 1975
as part D of the Social Security Act. The statute authorized federal match-
ing grants to states to collect support obligations, to establish paternity,
and to obtain support awards. In turn, states had to provide child support
enforcement services to welfare recipients (Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children, or AFDC) and any nonwelfare family who requested them.
Furthermore, it decreed that, as a condition of receiving cash beneﬁts,
AFDC families had to assign their rights to collect child support to the
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Robert I. Lerman and Elaine Sorensenstate to compensate it for the cost of providing aid to the family, and they
had to cooperate with the CSE agency in establishing paternity and secur-
ing support. Thus, Congress created two functions for the child support
enforcement programs that remain today: to increase child support and re-
duce welfare costs.
CSE helps set and enforce the terms of private transfers, directing the
ﬂow from a responsible donor (the noncustodial parent) to a deserving re-
cipient (the child). In contrast, standard transfer programs establish no di-
rect link between an individual taxpayer and a recipient. Instead, the
source of the transfer is from taxpayers as a whole and the payments go to
recipients as a whole. In practice, the case of CSE varies with the welfare
status of the family. For nonwelfare families, CSE ensures that individual
donors meet their responsibility to individual recipients. For welfare fam-
ilies, CSE establishes a link between payments by a responsible donor and
dollar savings by taxpayers.
Child support’s direct eﬀect upon noncustodial parents is central to un-
derstanding how its incentive and distributional eﬀects diﬀer from those of
standard income transfer programs. We must explicitly take account of not
only the recipient’s utility function, incentives, and income level, but the
donor’s as well. One implication is that the eﬀects on the distribution across
income groups are less clear than those of standard income transfer pro-
grams. Since the incomes of the donors can be lower than the incomes of
recipients, raising support payments could yield little reduction in inequal-
ity or poverty, especially if the relevant policies themselves create costly dis-
incentives. Some noncustodial parents view their payments as nothing
more than a tax, either because they gain little or no utility from raising
their child’s living standard or because their support payments simply
oﬀset government beneﬁts. In such cases, child support payments clearly
exert a direct eﬀect on the incentives of the donor as well as of the recipient.
In addition, CSE provides a set of open-ended services that are not
means-tested as are other transfer programs. For all custodial parents, the
state CSE agency will assist in establishing support awards and collecting
them. Even in the absence of formal income testing in CSE programs, the
program ends up targeting low-income families because so many custodial
families are poor. In 1997, 37 percent of custodial parent families were
poor and only 20 percent had incomes greater than 300 percent of the
poverty threshold. Nonetheless, the involvement of moderate-income par-
ents inﬂuences the perception, operations, and political debate over CSE
in ways that are not present for other means-tested programs. On one
hand, the role of CSE becomes less controversial when seeking support for
moderate-income parents because noncustodial parents usually have the
capacity, if not the will, to pay. On the other hand, middle-income fathers
subject to higher support awards and more rigorous collection strategies
have increasingly sought assistance in claiming their visitation rights.
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terplay between child support and income transfer programs. When the
majority of low-income, one-parent families received AFDC, custodial
parents eligible for child support often faced weak incentives to seek sup-
port, and noncustodial parents saw little gain for their children by making
support payments. Today, as fewer families receive cash welfare assistance,
support payments can become more of a supplement to the incomes of
low-income families and less of a substitute for government beneﬁts. For
low-income families, this means that child support can raise the living stan-
dards of their children. For states, however, this means that their CSE pro-
grams have less ability to reduce welfare costs.
The purpose of this paper is to examine child support policies, especially
the activities of the Child Support Enforcement Program, and how they in-
teract with transfer policies and aﬀect the low-income population. Section
9.2 reviews the history of the CSE program, its rules, and objectives. Next,
in section 9.3, we review the economic rationale for government’s role in
child support. In section 9.4, we describe trends in child support awards
and payments. In section 9.5, we discuss the importance of child support
to low-income families. The next section, 9.6, examines the capacity of
noncustodial parents to pay child support. Section 9.7 discusses the trends
in costs and eﬀectiveness of the child support program. Section 9.8 reviews
the ﬁnancing of this program. In section 9.9, we examine the eﬀects of child
support incentives on behavior. Section 9.10 discusses remaining equity is-
sues within child support. In section 9.11, we consider several reform pro-
posals. The ﬁnal section draws conclusions about directions for the future
of child support policies.
9.2 Program History, Rules, and Goals
State family law has traditionally governed marriage, divorce, child
custody and support, adoption, and child welfare.1 Under state statutes,
mothers2 were able to go to local and state courts to request payments and
custody as part of a divorce, separation, or paternity proceeding. When
the parents could not agree, judges used a great deal of discretion to de-
cide how much noncustodial parents were to pay as child support and/or
alimony. This approach was problematic in several respects. First, low-
income parents too often had little access to the system because of the high
expense of going to court. Second, judicial discretion led to wide varia-
tions in child support obligations, even among divorce or paternity cases
involving similar circumstances. Third, the only recourse for the nonpay-
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2. Since custodial parents are nearly always mothers and noncustodial parents are nearly
always fathers, we will sometimes use gender-speciﬁc language.ment of child support was going back to court, which had proven ineﬀec-
tive.
When the federal government began to intervene in 1950, its focus was
on children receiving public assistance because of abandonment or deser-
tion by parents.3The 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act required
state welfare agencies to notify law enforcement oﬃcials so that the legal
responsibilities of the parent could be enforced and thus allow welfare pro-
grams to count support payments as resources available to the family
(Solomon 1989).
The Social Security Amendments of 1974 marked the ﬁrst signiﬁcant in-
volvement of the federal government in making child support policy
(Solomon 1989). As table 9.1 notes, the 1974 amendments established the
federal Oﬃce of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) to oversee the state
child support enforcement programs but left the basic responsibility for
administering the programs to the states. The federal government agreed
to reimburse 75 percent of the administrative costs of running the program
(which has since declined to 66 percent). In turn, each state had to estab-
lish a child support enforcement program that assisted AFDC families and
any other non-AFDC family who requested such services in establishing
paternity and child support obligations, and enforcing those obligations.
Since then, virtually every Congress has passed federal laws to expand
enforcement tools, alter the incentive formulas for states, and limit the abil-
ity of noncustodial parents to escape their obligations. Indeed, with new
provisions becoming law in 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990,
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, Congress has clearly
found a popular area for legislation. The most important laws enacted are
described below.
9.2.1 Establishing Paternity
Legal paternity is rarely an issue for children born to married parents,
but it is always an issue for children born outside of marriage. As nonmar-
ital childbearing has risen, so has the concern regarding paternity estab-
lishment. For CSE, it is a critical ﬁrst step; without it, additional child sup-
port services cannot be pursued. The federal government’s role in this area
signiﬁcantly increased in 1988, when it set numeric goals for states to meet
with regard to paternity establishment and ﬁnancial penalties for not meet-
ing these goals. By that time, DNA testing could identify a father with near
certainty, and the federal government mandated that all parties in a con-
tested paternity case submit to genetic testing if requested by any party. It
also gave greater ﬁnancial responsibility to the federal government for ge-
netic testing and established time limits for processing paternity cases.
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3. See Brito (2000) for a discussion of the interaction between family law and welfare law as
governing child support cases.Table 9.1 Major Changes in Federal Laws Aﬀecting Child Support Enforcement
1950 The ﬁrst federal child support enforcement legislation was Section 402(a)(11) of the Social
Security Act, which required state welfare agencies to notify law enforcement oﬃcials
upon providing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to a child who was
abandoned or deserted by a parent.
1975 PL 93-647, The Social Security Amendments of 1974 created Part D to Title IV of the
Social Security Act, providing federal matching funds to states for child support
enforcement for AFDC cases and creating a separate unit (the Oﬃce of Child Support
Enforcement) within the federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now
Health and Human Services) to establish standards for states, provide them with technical
assistance, evaluate and review state plans and program operations, and certify cases for
referral to the federal courts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for enforcement and
collection. Each recipient of AFDC was required to assign support rights to the state and
cooperate in establishing paternity and securing support. A disregard policy was
established, and an audit division was created within the program.
1980–82 These years saw federal laws extending and strengthening the information-gathering and
enforcement powers of state child support agencies under Title IV-D. In 1980, PL 96-272
amended Title IV-D to provide incentive payments to the states for child support
collections they made in all AFDC cases and made federal matching funds available for
serving non-AFDC families on a permanent basis. In 1981, PL 97-35 added provisions to
IV-D programs authorizing the IRS to withhold all or part of federal income tax refunds
from nonpaying parents. It also required states to withhold a portion of unemployment
beneﬁts from absent parents delinquent on their support payments. In 1982, three new
public laws reduced federal ﬁnancial participation in child support enforcement but also
allowed for members of the armed forces to have their wages garnished for nonpayment of
child support and provided for disclosure of information obtained under the Food Stamp
Act of 1977.
1984 The Child Support Enforcement Amendments (PL 98-378) mandated that the states
establish improved enforcement mechanisms, including expedited procedures for
establishing orders and collecting support. They required that states provide equal services
for welfare and nonwelfare families, revised federal auditing procedures and incentive
payments, and required states to implement mandatory wage withholding for delinquent
cases. New funding was made available for developing automated systems, including those
for interstate enforcement.
1988 The Family Support Act (PL 100-485) contained several provisions to strengthen
enforcement on AFDC cases. The act required judges and other oﬃcials to use state
guidelines for child support awards, and mandated three-year reviews for AFDC cases. It
set standards for state establishment of paternity and allowed for federal reimbursement
for the costs of paternity testing. It required immediate wage withholding for all new or
modiﬁed orders, beginning in January 1994, and even earlier (November 1990) for cases
enforced by the CSE program. All states were required to develop and put in place
statewide automated tracking and monitoring systems by October 1995 or face federal
penalties.
1989–90;  Each year saw expanded state mandates or penalties on individuals for noncompliance. 
1992–94 For example, PL 102-521 (1992) imposed criminal penalties for willful failure to pay past-
due child support obligations. PL 103-66 (1993) increased the percentage of children for
whom a state must establish paternity and required states to adopt laws mandating civil
procedures for the voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.
(continued)It wasn’t until 1993, however, that the federal government required states
to establish voluntary procedures for acknowledging paternity in the hos-
pital. Since then, every state has adopted an in-hospital paternity acknowl-
edgment program, and federal rules in this area have been strengthened and
broadened. Today, if a father signs a paternity acknowledgment form in the
hospital, he will be considered the legal father of the child unless it is re-
scinded within sixty days, except in limited circumstances of fraud, duress,
or material mistake of fact. Genetic testing is not required to sign these
forms; nor is it necessarily suﬃcient evidence to overturn the legal require-
ments of being a father once a paternity acknowledgment form is signed.
9.2.2 Establishing Child Support Awards
Setting child support awards has historically been the responsibility of
the courts. Child support orders were typically set on a case-by-case basis,
in accordance with broadly enunciated principles of family law. Over time,
conﬁdence waned in the ability of judges to use discretion wisely, as judges
appeared to mandate widely diﬀerent support obligations to families in
similar circumstances.
States responded to this perceived unfairness of judicial discretion by
developing numeric guidelines for judges to follow when establishing child
support awards. State initiatives started as early as 1975, but most states
did not establish child support guidelines until Congress mandated that
they do so in 1984. At that time, Congress required the states to adopt nu-
meric child support guidelines and to make them available to those respon-
sible for setting child support awards. These guidelines were not binding;
they were “advisory.” It was not until 1988 that Congress required that state
child support guidelines be binding on judges (unless a written ﬁnding was
issued).
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Table 9.1 (continued)
1996 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PL 104-193)
required that states operate a child support program that met federal mandates in order to
be eligible for block grants under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
States were required to expand their eﬀorts in income withholding, paternity
establishment, enforcement of orders, and the use of central registries. The act provided
for uniform rules, procedures, and forms for interstate cases. It established a Federal Case
Registry and National Directory of New Hires to track delinquent parents across state
lines. The act altered the federal and state shared of the $50 disregard to families receiving
public assistance on whose behalf child support payments were made and eliminated the
mandate on the states to provide for a disregard.
1998 The Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act (PL 105-187) toughened the 1992 law creating
federal criminal penalties for willful failure to pay past-due child support by creating two
new categories of federal felonies with penalties of up to two years in prison.
Sources: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1997a); Institute for Research on Poverty
(2000).Today, federal law dictates that child support orders must be set in ac-
cordance with state child support guidelines, unless the judge writes a jus-
tiﬁcation, or “ﬁnding,” that explains why the application of the guidelines
is inappropriate. In other words, the presumption is that judges will follow
state child support guidelines. The principle rationale of judges for deviat-
ing from the guidelines is that such deviations will be in the best interests
of the child.
States are expected to develop their own child support guidelines within
broad parameters set by the federal government. All of the states have de-
veloped guidelines that ultimately make payments a function of the income
of the noncustodial parent, at least on a marginal basis. Two models dom-
inate state child support guidelines: percentage of income and income
shares (Williams 1994).
Currently, thirteen states set payments equal to a percentage of before-
tax or after-tax income of the noncustodial parent, with the percentage
varying with the number of children (Rothe and Meyer 2000). According
to the well-known Wisconsin standard, the percentages vary from 17 per-
cent of gross income for one child to 25 percent for two, 29 percent for
three, and 34 percent for four or more. Minnesota requires fathers of four
children with net incomes of over $1,000 per month to pay 39 percent of
net income.
Under the income-shares approach used in almost all other states, the
noncustodial parent pays some percentage of the combined income of the
two parents. In fourteen income-share states, the percentage of income
paid for child support decreases with the level of combined parental in-
come; in sixteen states, the percentage increases and then decreases. When
the percentage of income allocated to children is a ﬁxed percentage of in-
come, the child support obligation rises proportionately with income. For
example, assuming the two parents must provide 20 percent for the child,
a $100 rise in income of the noncustodial parent raises his support order by
$20. However, as Bassi and Barnow (1993) show, when the percentage al-
located to child support increases or decreases with joint income, some
odd impacts occur. An increase in the custodial parent’s income can raise
support obligations of the noncustodial parent even if his income remains
constant. In some cases where the percentage of income paid decreases
with combined income, an increase in the noncustodial parent’s income
can lower his contribution.
Child support guidelines typically use current income to determine the
amount of a child support order, but a parent’s current income may not re-
ﬂect his or her earnings potential. In particular, a parent may be voluntar-
ily underemployed or unemployed. In these cases, judges may impute in-
come based on a parent’s earnings potential. Determining whether a parent
is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed is not straightforward.
Fore xample, some judges have ruled that imprisonment is voluntary and
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ruled that imprisonment is involuntary and thus their order should reﬂect
current earnings (Morgan 1998). Staying home to take care of a child is an-
other example in which what is deemed voluntary varies with the judge and
the state. Some states and most judges do not impute an income to a parent
if she had been staying home prior to the marital separation, but staying
home to care for subsequent children is generally considered voluntary.
In addition, current income is not typically used in determining default
child support orders, which are issued whenever noncustodial parents do
not appear at the time the order is set. In these situations, there is often no
income information for the noncustodial parent. Noncustodial parents are
informed of the hearing, often through ﬁrst class mail, but many still do
not appear. States have established diﬀerent procedures to respond to this
situation, and judges are usually given discretion in this matter. Further-
more, some states do not base a default order on ability to pay, but base it
on a minimum standard of care for a child (Sorensen 1999).
A third issue arises when parents share physical custody. As children
spend increasing amounts of time under the care of the parent legally des-
ignated as noncustodial, the notion of custodial and noncustodial parents
as ﬁxed categories becomes less appropriate. In principle, child support for-
mulas should alter the payment obligations to reﬂect the extent to which
both parents are caring for and paying the expenses of children. However,
making equitable adjustments is diﬃcult to implement. Determining the ac-
tual time and expense each parent incurs and making appropriate adjust-
ments would require frequent updating of support obligations. Some costs,
such as the need for a room for the child, are ﬁxed and largely independent
of the amount of visitation by a noncustodial parent. Currently, few state
formulas take account of the costs incurred by the noncustodial parent by
lowering support obligations. Some formulas make adjustments, but only
when the noncustodial parent has the child for more than 20 percent of the
time.4 An exception is California, where the noncustodial parent’s obliga-
tions peak when no sharing of physical responsibility takes place and then
decline as the shared component of physical responsibility increases.
9.2.3 Collecting Child Support
The primary means by which CSE collects child support is wage with-
holding. Congress ﬁrst mandated this tool in 1984, and it has since been
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4. Apparently, the perception arose that widely used guidelines incorporate the costs of
shared custody up to a threshold of 20 percent and thus require no downward adjustment for
noncustodial parents providing 20 percent of the child’s care and possibly an upward adjust-
ment for noncustodial parents providing no care at all. But according to Robert G. Williams
(1996), the primary author of the guidelines used in many states, guidelines in Ohio (and pre-
sumably similar states) do not presume a 20 percent sharing arrangement and make no ad-
justment for costs incurred in visitation or shared custody. Also see Henry (1999).strengthened numerous times. At ﬁrst, wage withholding was only manda-
tory for child support obligors who were at least one month behind in their
child support orders. This approach gave way to “immediate wage with-
holding,” which states began to implement in the late 1980s. Immediate
wage withholding means that as soon as an order is established, child sup-
port is taken directly from wages (no delinquency is needed to initiate wage
withholding). Since 1994, the federal government has required that all new
child support orders include an immediate wage assignment. The only ex-
ceptions are for cases of good cause (for example, a fear that withholding
will lead to domestic violence) or cases in which the parties mutually agree
to an alternate agreement.
Although state agencies now have authority and responsibility to estab-
lish immediate wage withholding on all new child support orders, their pri-
mary diﬃculty is maintaining contact with the noncustodial parents’ em-
ployers over time. To deal with this administrative problem, Congress
required in 1996 that all employers report every new hire within twenty
days of hire to the CSE agency. The data from these reports are, in turn,
matched against child support obligors. If a match is found, a wage with-
holding form is sent to the employer to begin immediate wage withholding.
The new hire reports are sent to the federal government, which, in turn, has
built a new data ﬁle called the National Directory of New Hires that can be
used for interstate child support collections eﬀorts.
9.2.4 Distribution of Support Payments to the Government and
Custodial Parents
Once collected, child support payments go to the custodial parent unless
the custodial parent is receiving or has received cash welfare beneﬁts. In
these cases, the distribution of child support is extremely complicated.
Custodial parents on welfare are required to assign their rights to child
support to the government. Thus, the government can retain any current
or past child support paid while the custodial parent is on welfare. Half of
this amount paid is typically distributed to the federal government; the
other half is retained by the state government. On one hand, these sums
simply reimburse the government for its costs of providing cash assistance
to the custodial family. However, to the extent the government captures
past as well as current child support, the custodial parent not only faces a
$1 beneﬁt reduction for each $1 of current child support income, but also
loses a portion of an asset (accumulated debts owed to the custodial par-
ent from the noncustodial parent).
Prior to PRWORA, Congress mandated that states pass through and
disregard the ﬁrst $50 per month of child support paid on behalf of welfare
families. Under PRWORA, Congress eliminated this mandate and re-
placed it with an option for states to pass through any amount of child sup-
port collected on behalf of the custodial parent to the family and disregard
Child Support 595that amount in determining cash assistance, but they were still required to
pay the federal government their half of any support collected. Despite this
onerous payment requirement, many states, especially the larger ones,
chose to continue their $50 child support pass-through and disregard pol-
icy, but most did not.
Once the custodial parent leaves welfare, any current support paid
by the noncustodial parent goes directly to the custodial parent and is
counted as income for other government programs (Barnow et al. 2000). If
past support is due, then who receives those payments depends on the
method of collection. If it is collected via wage withholding, which most
arrears are, then the custodial parent receives it. On the other hand, if it is
collected via intercept programs, then the government receives it.
Many child support advocates and administrators have argued for sim-
pliﬁcation of the distribution rules, and the House of Representatives
passed legislation in 2000 that would have simpliﬁed them, but this legis-
lation died in the Senate. Similar legislation will probably be reintroduced
because the distribution rules are so complicated.
9.2.5 Retroactive Support
In divorce cases, child support orders typically start at the time of the di-
vorce settlement, but courts may go back to the date of separation. Thus,
most divorce cases do not start out with large arrearages. In nonmarital
cases, on the other hand, states can go back as far as the child’s birth if they
wish, even though the order may have been requested much later. Thus,
nonmarital cases often start with large arrearages as the result of retroac-
tive support, arrearages owed both to the government and to the custodial
parent. Retroactive support amounts depend on what would have been
owed on the noncustodial parent’s actual or imputed income in prior years.
Some states also include the birthing costs of a Medicaid birth as part of
the retroactive support.
9.3 Economic Rationale for Government’s Role in Child Support
The work of Weiss and Willis (1985) provided the ﬁrst formal analysis of
the ineﬃciencies that arise in divorce because of the collective-good char-
acter of expenditures on children. Since both the custodial and noncusto-
dial parents derive utility from their children, children are a couple-speciﬁc
public or collective good. While the parents live together, proximity, altru-
ism, and mutual trust serve to overcome the “free-rider” problem associ-
ated with the provision of public goods. However, once the parents live
apart, these positive attributes tend to weaken. The noncustodial parent
can no longer inﬂuence or monitor the allocation of resources between
public and private goods; child support is paid to the custodial parent,
who, in turn, decides how it will be allocated. This loss of control leads to
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custodial parents spend on supporting their children declines. Weiss and
Willis (1993) estimate that expenditures on children when their parents are
divorced are only half the amount provided during marriage. Graham
and Beller (forthcoming) provide a simple model showing how non-
cooperation among parents reduces children’s consumption. Both parents
gain utility from their own and from their child’s consumption, but, espe-
cially when they are apart, each parent would prefer to maximize the cost
of the child’s consumption borne by the other parent. Using reaction func-
tions, Graham and Beller ﬁnd that the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg so-
lutions of these non-cooperative games yield lower expenditures on chil-
dren than when the parents cooperate.
Government interventions to determine custody and visitation, specify
support obligations, and collect payments are ways to raise spending by
noncustodial parents closer to eﬃcient levels. However, such policies do
not resolve the underlying collective-goods problem because custodial
parents are able to allocate support payments in ways that are suboptimal
from the point of view of noncustodial parents. The added collections of
child support from noncustodial parents may be partly oﬀset by reduced
spending on children by custodial parents. As a result, noncustodial par-
ents may begin to view their payments as an involuntary tax not going to
support their children.
One direct and compelling incentive for noncustodial parents to pay
support arises with the link between visitation and support payments.
Ribero (1994) argues that negotiations between parents lead to a joint vis-
itation–child support outcome in which noncustodial fathers trade income
for visitations allowed by mothers. Although estimates do not entirely con-
ﬁrm the theoretical model involving negotiations for child time and
parental consumption, Ribero maintains that the level of child support
paid by noncustodial fathers may not be “too low” but, rather, the amount
that yields an optimal visitation-payment outcome.
These models highlight a key diﬀerence between child support and other
transfer programs. Unlike standard welfare programs, child support trans-
fers link an individual donor with an individual recipient. Because the value
of the transfer to the donor can depend on the behavior and circumstances
of the recipient, child support directly alters the incentives of donors as well
as recipients. In some ways, the interest in taking account of the incentive
eﬀects on donors is similar to the recognition that transfers require taxes
that may induce distortions and impose real social costs. (We are referring
to the literature on the marginal eﬃciency costs of public funds.) However,
in the case of child support, the clear expectation is that the utility of the do-
nor depends directly and strongly on the income of the recipient (his child).
Another critical government role is to establish paternity and support
awards. As Willis (1999) shows in a recent theoretical paper, relying on
Child Support 597the unfettered incentives of men and women can lead to an equilibrium in
which out-of-wedlock childbearing is widespread. According to the
model, when women outnumber men or women’s incomes are high relative
to those of men, some share of low-income men will choose to father chil-
dren outside marriage and some low-income women will voluntarily bear
and raise children outside marriage. As a result, marriage as an institution
for raising children is undermined, and children receive lower resources
than would be the case if all fathers married. Willis points out that eﬀective
paternity establishment and collection of child support can reduce the at-
tractiveness of nonmarital fatherhood and lower the fraction of children
born and raised outside marriage. Since high rates of nonmarital births im-
pose a variety of costs on taxpayers—from direct welfare support to com-
pensatory payments aimed at helping children born and raised outside of
marriage to overcome educational and other problems associated with
having fewer economic and social resources—lowering the nonmarital
birth rate is very much in their interests. Studies noted later ﬁnd evidence
to support the connection between government eﬀorts to establish pater-
nity and reduced out-of-wedlock childbearing.
Averting the direct and indirect costs to third parties that result from di-
vorce provides another justiﬁcation for government intervention in child
support enforcement. However, the theoretical impact of strict enforce-
ment is unclear. Higher support payments raise the ability of custodial par-
ents to raise children outside marriage while increasing the costs of divorce
to noncustodial parents. Here is another instance in which child support
policies interact with welfare programs. Child support should reduce di-
vorce most among the lowest-income families, since child support prima-
rily substitutes for welfare payments and does little to increase the inde-
pendence of custodial parents. In moderate-income families, both the
independence eﬀect for potential custodial parents and the support costs
facing potential noncustodial parents come into play. Several empirical
studies noted later examine which eﬀect appears to predominate.
9.4 Trends in Child Support Awards and Payments
Collecting formal child support requires several steps, as illustrated with
the following equation showing the average payment per child living with
a custodial parent as the product of four key quantities.








where Cis the amount collected per child living with a custodial parent, LF
is the percent of children with a legal noncustodial parent, A is the percent
of children for whom a support award is present and due, S is the average
size of the award, and P is the amount paid on the award.
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in child support, most of the emphasis was on the fourth component: col-
lecting a high share of the amount owed. The movement to create child
support guidelines was partly prompted by the recognition of the impor-
tance of the third component: the average size of awards. In recent years,
administrators have started putting resources behind raising LF and A.
Note that even were the government to insure a perfect collection record
(P/S   1), collections could erode if LF declined over time.
The Census Bureau has compiled data on some of these components
(with custodial mothers as the unit of analysis) since the late 1970s, using
the April Current Population Survey-Child Support Supplement (CPS-
CSS). Unfortunately, we cannot determine LF and thus the impact of a low
paternity establishment rate on collections. However, table 9.2 presents
trends in the product of components one and two, which equals the share
due an award.
Note that despite massive changes in federal and state laws regarding
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Table 9.2 Trends in Child Support Awards and Payments: 1978–97
All Custodial Mothers Poor Custodial Mothers
%
%% R e c e ived Payments % % % 
Received with among Received Received with Received
Child an Those perMother Child an among 
Support Award Due (1997 $) Support Award Those Due
1978 34.6 59.1 71.6 1,532 17.8 38.1 58.8
1981 34.6 59.2 71.7 1,286 19.3 39.6 61.4
1983 34.9 57.7 76.0 1,317 19.6 42.4 62.0
1985 36.8 61.2 74.0 1,216 21.3 40.4 65.7
1987 38.5 58.0 76.1 1,469 27.3 43.4 72.0
1989 37.4 57.7 75.2 1,449 25.4 42.3 68.3
1991 37.6 55.8 76.3 1,334 24.1 38.9 70.4
1993 36.4 59.7 70.9 1,305 27.5 51.9 64.9
1995 37.4 61.2 69.8 1,484 26.5 51.1 61.9
1997 36.4 59.5 68.5 1,331 24.8 53.0 55.0
Sources:U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (2000), U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www.chldsupt.html, various tables. Dollar ﬁgures are adjusted to re-
ﬂect 1997 dollars using the CPI-U as the inﬂation adjustment.
Notes: Data for 1993, 1995, and 1997 are not directly comparable to earlier years because of major
changes in the April Current Population Survey–Child Support Supplement. In particular, the percent-
age of amounts due to custodial parents that were actually received may appear lower in the 1993–97
data than in earlier periods because the recent data include amounts of “back payments due” whereas
the pre-1993 data included only current amounts due in the denominator. Note also that in the CPS-CSS,
“child support awards” and “child support due” are not the same. “Child support awards” measures the
existence of an award at the time of the survey (April); “child support due” indicates whether child sup-
port income was expected last calendar year. Thus, multiplying the second and third columns does not
necessarily equal the ﬁrst column, as our simple formula in the text might suggest.child support and billions of dollars spent on child support enforcement,
trends in child support awards and real payments are disturbingly un-
changed or have declined according to the CPS-CSS. Table 9.2 shows that
the percent of custodial mothers who received child support has increased
only slightly since 1978, from 35 percent in 1978 to 36 percent in 1997. Fur-
thermore, table 9.2 shows a remarkable constancy since the late 1970s not
only in the percentage of custodial mothers receiving child support, but
also in the percentage of custodial mothers with an award, receiving sup-
port among those with an award, and the amount of child support received
per custodial mother. Moreover, the ability of the CSE system to collect on
the amounts actually due to custodial mothers improved after 1981, but it
appears to have stagnated ever since. In 1978, the CPS reports indicate that
72 percent of the total amounts due were actually collected; this ﬁgure rose
to 76 percent in 1983, then remained near that level through 1991. The data
in table 9.2 show a decline to 68–69 percent in 1993 through 1997, but these
ﬁgures are not exactly comparable to earlier years since they include
amounts due to custodial parents that are owed on unpaid support from
prior years.
These data also show, however, that poor custodial mothers are much
more likely to receive child support in 1997 than they were in 1978. In 1997,
25 percent of poor custodial mothers received child support, up from 18
percent in 1978. As table 9.2 shows, most of this gain is due to increased
award rates among poor custodial mothers, rather than increased collec-
tions on existing awards. In 1997, 53 percent of poor custodial mothers had
a child support award, up from 38 percent in 1978.
Underlying these disparate results for custodial mothers and poor cus-
todial mothers is a dramatic shift in the marital status composition of cus-
todial mothers, away from divorced and separated mothers toward never-
married mothers, which aﬀected all custodial mothers more than it
aﬀected poor custodial mothers. Table 9.3 shows that never-married moth-
ers increased from 20 percent to 32 percent of all custodial mothers be-
tween 1981 and 1997. Over the same period, the share of never-married
mothers with awards more than tripled from 14 percent to 47 percent and
the share receiving a payment also tripled from 7 percent from 22 percent.
Still, even had the composition of custodial mothers remained at 1981 lev-
els, the overall improvement in awards and collections would have been
modest. The proportion with support awards would have increased from
59 percent to 62 percent, and the proportion receiving a payment would
have risen from 35 percent to 39 percent.
It is important to note that the success or failure in the collection of child
support depends, in part, on the interest of the custodial parent in collect-
ing support and on the income of the noncustodial parent. To better un-
derstand why so many custodial parents did not receive child support, the
Census Bureau has asked custodial parents to indicate their reasons for not
600 Robert I. Lerman and Elaine Sorensenhaving a legal child support award. Many custodial parents gave multiple
responses, but the most common responses in 1996 were “did not feel the
need to have a legal agreement” and “other parent could not aﬀord to pay”
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999). In addition, nearly one in four (23 per-
cent) custodial mothers without awards stated they did not want to have
contact with the other parent. Recent studies of nonmarital births indicate
that about half of unmarried parents are living together at the time of the
birth, vitiating the interest in and collection of child support (Garﬁnkel,
McLanahan, and Harknett 1999).
The most recent detailed proﬁle of families who do and do not receive
child support comes from the analysis by Sorensen and Zibman (2000) of
the 1997 National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF). According to the
1997 NSAF, only about 52 percent of children with a nonresident father
had a court-ordered child support award. This award percentage among
children is 8 percentage points lower than the 60 percent ﬁgure observed in
the 1997 CPS among mothers, presumably because the CPS ﬁgure includes
all written agreements, not only those ratiﬁed by courts. However, the
NSAF ﬁgure for the proportion with an award and a payment is 34 per-
cent, nearly as high as the 36 percent ﬁgure for the CPS. Tabulations from
the NSAF provide information on the receipt of ﬁnancial support from
noncustodial fathers who do not have a formal support order. Fully 36 per-
cent of children lacking awards still receive some support from their father.
Overall, Sorensen and Zibman estimate that 53 percent of noncustodial fa-
thers provided assistance within the prior twelve months.
One striking ﬁnding from the Sorensen-Zibman study is the large varia-
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Table 9.3 Changes in Awards and Payments by Marital Status of Custodial Mothers: 
1981 and 1997
% of Custodial 
% Distribution of  % of Custodial Mothers  Mothers Receiving a 
Custodial Mothers with Support Awards Payment
1981 1997 1981 1997 1981 1997
Married 26.2 21.9 77.8 65.3 39.3 45.0
Divorced 34.1 30.9 80.5 70.4 52.5 47.3
Separated 18.5 13.1 42.8 56.2 26.7 32.4
Widowed 0.8 1.9 68.8 54.3 14.1 27.0
Never married 20.4 32.2 14.3 46.7 6.6 22.3
Total 100.0 100.0 59.2 59.5 34.6 36.4
1997 levels, using 
1981 marital 
status distribution 61.4 38.7
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census publications and tabulations by authors.
Note: See table 9.2.tion across states in the receipt of child support. Among the thirteen states
with large samples, the proportion of children with a noncustodial parent,
with a child support order, and receiving the full amount due ranges from
14 percent and 15 percent in California and New York to 29 percent and
30 percent in Minnesota and Wisconsin.
9.5 Importance of Child Support For Low-Income Families
Several recent studies have examined the extent to which child support
reduces welfare dependency and child poverty and whether it contributes
to self-suﬃciency and income equality (Meyer and Hu 1999; Wheaton and
Sorensen 1998a; Sorensen and Zibman 2000). In general, these studies ﬁnd
that child support reduces welfare dependency and child poverty, but only
slightly, and contributes to self-suﬃciency and income equality, but only
slightly. One of the reasons that child support has such limited redistribu-
tional eﬀects is that the government keeps essentially all of the child sup-
port paid on behalf of children who are on public assistance.
Most recently, Sorensen and Zibman (2000) estimate that child support
payments lift nearly half a million children out of poverty, reducing
poverty among children eligible to receive child support by 5 percent. They
also estimate that child support reduces these children’s poverty gap by 8
percent. They also ﬁnd that child support payments reduce the Gini coeﬃ-
cient among custodial families, but only slightly, suggesting that child sup-
port contributes to income equality among those eligible for it.
Sorensen and Zibman also show that child support appears relatively
unimportant to the average child, representing a mere 2 percent of family
income, but that child support is an important source of income for chil-
dren who receive it, especially among low-income children. Table 9.4
shows that only 39 percent of children eligible for child support received it
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Table 9.4 Child Support Characteristics of Children with a Noncustodial Parent by
Their Poverty Status: 1996
Among Families Receiving 
Child Support
% of Children with a
Noncustodial Parent Average As % of
Poverty Whose Family Received Amount Family
Status (%) Child Support Received ($) Income
Less than 100 29 1,979 26
100–199 40 3,265 15
200–299 45 4,373 12
300 or more 50 5,764 9
All 39 3,795 16
Source: 1997 National Survey of America’s Families.in 1996, but the average amount received by these families was $3,795, rep-
resenting, on average, 16 percent of their family income. Among poor chil-
dren eligible for child support, only 29 percent of their families received
child support in 1996, and the average amount received was $1,979, but it
represented, on average, 26 percent of their family income.
The NSAF data also show that receipt of child support among poor chil-
dren diﬀers substantially by welfare status. Among poor children, child sup-
port went to only 22 percent of children on welfare in the prior year but
to36 percent of children not on welfare. Of the poor children whose family
had left welfare, 42 percent received child support, averaging $2,562 per
year or 30 percent of family income. In contrast, child support paid to chil-
dren on welfare amounted to only $816 per year for those receiving a pay-
ment. Child support can be an important supplement to income, but rarely
is the payment of support enough to make up for a lack of earnings or other
income sources. Sorensen and Zibman show that among poor children not
on AFDC, nearly half of the family income comes from earnings.
Compared to other beneﬁt programs, child support plays a sizable role
in moving poor single-mother families above the poverty line (Meyer and
Hu 1999). In 1995, about 6–7 percent of poor mother-only families became
nonpoor as a result of child support payments. This outﬂow was higher
than those moved out of poverty by social insurance programs and was
about the same as those removed from poverty through welfare programs.
However, part of the reason is that those receiving child support had pre-
transfer incomes closer to the poverty line than did welfare recipients. Wel-
fare removed 28.5 percent of the poverty gap of the pretransfer poor, while
child support ﬁlled only about 6 percent of the gap.
Evidence that improvements in child support collections are responsible
for some of the recent reductions in welfare caseloads comes from a recent
work by Huang, Garﬁnkel, and Waldfogel (1999). The two-stage least
squares model used by the authors includes a ﬁrst stage that predicts child
support collections as a function of political variables and other factors
and a second stage that predicts welfare caseloads (logged) as a function of
predicted child support collections as well as welfare beneﬁt levels; ﬁxed
state and year eﬀects; and state demographic, political, and economic vari-
ables. The ﬁndings indicate that eﬀective child support enforcement re-
duces welfare caseloads both by reducing the proportion of single mothers
receiving welfare and by reducing the number of single mothers. Simula-
tions indicate that child support improvements accounted for about one-
quarter of the decline in welfare caseloads between 1994 and 1996.
9.6 Capacity of Noncustodial Parents to Pay Child Support
Although census household surveys have collected child support data
from custodial mothers since the late 1970s, few surveys have collected
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had problems identifying noncustodial fathers because of reporting and
coverage problems. Research shows that male fertility is underreported in
household surveys and that noncustodial fathers’ fertility is particularly
underreported (Cherlin, Griﬃth, and McCarthy 1983; Clarke, Cooksey,
and Verropoulou 1998). Two groups outside of the sampling frame of
household surveys that are particularly relevant to identifying noncusto-
dial fathers are the institutionalized and those in the military (Sorensen
1997). In addition, household surveys undercount certain groups, espe-
cially young minority males in their late twenties and early thirties, a group
that disproportionately consists of noncustodial fathers (Sorensen 1997).
Given the lack of household survey data on noncustodial fathers and the
policy interest in their ability to pay, Garﬁnkel and Oellerich (1989) devel-
oped an indirect method of imputing noncustodial fathers’ income using
the characteristics of custodial mothers. Initially, this method used the re-
lationship between married fathers’ earnings and their wives’ characteris-
tics to estimate the relationship between noncustodial fathers’ earnings
and the characteristics of the mothers of their children. More recent up-
dates have used divorced couples’ earnings and characteristics and the
earnings of unwed men to predict the earnings of noncustodial fathers
(Miller, Garﬁnkel, and McLanahan 1997). Although these updates have
reduced the distortion that occurs because of unobserved variables and/or
self-selection, it is still expected that this approach will yield upwardly bi-
ased earnings estimates. Nonetheless, using this method, Miller et al. esti-
mated noncustodial fathers’ average income by marital status, which, in
1990, ranged from $13,621 for never-married fathers to $28,226 for remar-
ried fathers.
The focus of this research was to ascertain the potential amount of child
support that noncustodial fathers could pay. Garﬁnkel and Oellerich found
that noncustodial fathers paid $7 billion in 1983, but they could have paid
between $24 and $30 billion that year (1989). These latter results were de-
rived by applying the child support guidelines in Wisconsin, Colorado, and
Delaware to the imputed incomes of noncustodial fathers in 1983. In other
words, if noncustodial fathers had paid child support according to these
state child support guidelines, they would have paid three to four times
what they actually paid that year. Of course, this does not mean that non-
custodial fathers legally owed $24 to $30 billion. Garﬁnkel and Oellerich
note that they legally owed only $10 billion that year.
More recently, Sorensen used the 1990 Survey of Income and Program
Participation and the 1987 National Survey of Families and Households
(NSFH) to identify noncustodial fathers and measure their ability to pay
child support (Sorensen 1997). Since these surveys suﬀer from reporting
and coverage problems, she develops a range of estimates regarding non-
custodial fathers’ ability to pay child support. Using the Wisconsin child
604 Robert I. Lerman and Elaine Sorensensupport guidelines, she found that noncustodial fathers paid around $17
billion in 1996, but they could have paid between $37 and $51 billion that
year.
It is also worth noting that Sorensen (1997) ﬁnds that a sizable minority
of noncustodial fathers are poor, possibly as many as 25 percent. Further-
more, she reports that as many as 35 percent of noncustodial fathers are
not working at all or are working intermittently in 1990. These ﬁgures are
considerably higher than those found among resident fathers, about 8 per-
cent of whom were poor during the same time period and 15 percent of
whom did not work year-round in 1990. Using a slightly diﬀerent method
of adjusting the 1987 NSFH for underreporting and coverage problems,
Garﬁnkel, McLanahan, and Hanson (1998) report that 20 percent of non-
custodial fathers earn less than $6,000 year.
Further details of the lives of poor noncustodial fathers can be found in
several recent ethnographic studies (Edin, Lein, and Nelson 1998; John-
son, Levine, and Doolittle 1999; Waller and Plotnick 1999; Pate and John-
son 2000) and in descriptive information from a recent demonstration
project called Parents’ Fair Share (PFS), which provided employment-
related services to unemployed noncustodial fathers who were behind in
their child support payments and had children receiving welfare (Martinez
and Miller 2000). These studies ﬁnd that poor noncustodial fathers face se-
vere employment barriers, including limited education, limited work expe-
rience, criminal records, housing instability, and poor health. For example,
the PFS demonstration found that nearly 70 percent of its participants had
a criminal record and nearly one-third had been arrested and charged with
a crime during their participation in the program.
Other researchers have used the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY79) to examine the characteristics of young noncustodial fa-
thers. In an analysis of the earnings and employment patterns of young un-
wed fathers over time, Lerman (1993) found that the earnings of young un-
wed fathers were similar to the earnings of other young men around the
time they fathered their children and that their earnings increased over
time, but their earnings did not grow at the same rate as their peers. Pirog-
Good and Good (1995) used the same data and found similar results.
Some studies have used data that include information on both the custo-
dial mother and the noncustodial father (Nichols-Casebolt 1986; Sonen-
stein and Calhoun 1990; Peters et al. 1993; Bianchi, Subaiya, and Kahn
1999). Nearly all of these studies examine divorcing couples at or around
the time of the divorce and approximately one year later. They typically re-
port that shortly after divorce, custodial mothers and children experience
a sharp decline in their economic well-being, whereas noncustodial fathers
do not. Duncan and Hoﬀman (1985) examined the incomes of divorcing
couples one year and ﬁve years after divorce. Their estimates show that,
even after ﬁve years, women’s incomes still lag behind those of their ex-
Child Support 605husbands but return to approximately their predivorce levels.5 These latter
increases, however, are often the result of a new spouse.
9.7 Trends in Costs and Eﬀectiveness of the Child Support System
One indicator of cost-eﬀectiveness of programs aimed at helping low-
income families is the resource cost of raising the incomes of low-income
families by $1. Making this judgment in the child support arena is more
complicated than doing so with the typical transfer program. It requires
examining the balance between administrative costs, economic distortions,
positive incentive eﬀects, and distributional shifts between low-income
families. A review of CSE’s performance should also take account of the
investment component of CSE spending. Put another way, some of the ad-
ministrative outlays go for computerization, for establishing paternity, and
for helping establish support orders. Because these investments may yield
a ﬂow of direct beneﬁts in the future in higher support payments, these out-
lays should be amortized over the life of the investment and not treated as
current expenses. Finally, the entire CSE system may generate long-term
indirect beneﬁts by reducing the number of never-married, separated, and
divorced parents.
In judging the role of the child support system, both the trend in overall
payments reported to the census and the trend in the amounts collected
through the CSE program are relevant indicators. Figure 9.1 shows the
trend in the percent of single mothers by marital status and welfare status
receiving child support based on the March CPS. Note that while the over-
all percentage of single mothers reporting at least some child support has
remained remarkably constant (at about 30 percent), the numbers receiv-
ing child support have increased sharply within groups of never-married
mothers and the welfare recipients who have ever been married. However,
the rise in the share of never-married mothers—the group for whom child
support is the exception, not the rule—is making collections harder to ob-
tain.
A recent study has examined the impact of state enforcement policies on
the receipt of child support payments (Sorensen and Hill, forthcoming).
This study strongly suggests that CSE programs raised support payments
above what they would have been. Among the never-married mothers, who
typically live in very low-income families, receipt of child support went
from about 4 percent of families in 1976 to 17.5 percent in 1997. Sorensen
and Hill ﬁnd about half of the gains are associated with the child support
system. About one-third of the much smaller increases among previously
married mothers resulted from CSE activities. Still, attaining these signiﬁ-
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5. Duncan and Hoﬀman (1985) examine divorcing couples regardless of the presence of
children, and thus these ﬁndings may not hold for divorcing couples with children.cant and large impacts apparently required substantial outlays for CSE
programs.
Trends in the amounts collected through the CSE program appear in
table 9.5. Note that CSE collections have increased rapidly over the period
but collections per case have remained constant. Thus, the growth in over-
all collections is a result of more cases ﬂowing through the CSE program,
not higher average real payments per case. Between 1978 and 1997, the
proportion of total child support that was collected through CSE pro-
grams rose from 23 percent to 85 percent (U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means 2000, 529).
At the same time, CSE administrative expenditures have been rising rap-
idly in real terms. In fact, total administrative outlays per custodial mother
tripled in real terms between 1983 and 1997; as of 1997, they amounted to
nearly 22 percent of total payments (see table 9.6). Since much of the child
support payments would have taken place without CSE, the administrative
cost per additional payment is no doubt well above 20 percent. For ex-
ample, if we attribute all of the $4.4 billion growth in aggregate payments
between 1978 and 1997 to CSE, the added CSE cost would amount to 57
percent of each additional $1 of child support. But it is unlikely that in the
absence of the CSE program aggregate support payments would have re-
mained constant in the face of the 50 percent growth in the number of cus-
todial mothers. In an analysis of the eﬀect of AFDC and non-AFDC ad-
ministrative expenditures on collections for AFDC and non-AFDC cases
over the 1979 to 1991 period, Nixon (1996) estimates that each dollar spent
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Fig. 9.1 Percent of single mothers receiving child support, by marital and AFDC
status: 1976–97.
Source: Sorensen and Hill (forthcoming).on AFDC cases yielded only an additional $0.10 in child support but that
a dollar spent on non-AFDC cases increased collections by $3.30.
Not surprisingly, the impact of money spent on administration is highly
sensitive to the activities undertaken with the added dollars. A demonstra-
tion project in four states tested whether reviewing and updating child sup-
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Table 9.5 Aggregate Child Support Collections Through the CSE Program and
Child Support Amounts per Case: 1978–98 ($1996)
CSE Cases with Payment by
Type (in 000s)
Aggregate Collections On Not on Total Child Support
($000) AFDC AFDC Cases Per case ($)
1978 2,555 458 249 707 3,614
1980 2,882 503 243 746 3,863
1982 2,885 597 448 1,045 2,761
1984 3,591 647 547 1,194 3,008
1986 4,609 582 786 1,368 3,369
1988 6,125 621 1,083 1,704 3,594
1990 7,272 701 1,363 2,064 3,523
1991 7,919 755 1,555 2,310 3,428
1992 8,921 836 1,749 2,585 3,451
1993 9,620 879 1,958 2,837 3,391
1994 10,441 926 2,169 3,095 3,374
1995 11,152 976 2,409 3,385 3,295
1996 12,019 940 2,564 3,504 3,430
1997 13,364 865 2,850 3,715 3,517
1998 13,811 789 3,070 3,859 3,579
Source: Oﬃce of Child Support Enforcement.
Table 9.6 Performance Indicators of CSE Program Based on CPS and CSE Data: 1978–97
Aggregate Custodial Total CSE Costs CSE Costs per CSE Costs as
Receipts (CPS) Mothers (CPS) (CSE data) Custodial Mother % of Payments
($1995 billions) (in millions) ($1995 millions) (CSE data) (CSE data)
1978 10.6 7.1 729 103 6.9
1981 10.3 8.4 882 105 8.6
1983 10.8 8.7 1,057 122 9.8
1985 10.2 8.8 1,153 131 11.3
1987 13.4 9.4 1,430 152 10.7
1989 13.7 10.0 1,675 168 12.2
1991 13.2 9.9 2,019 204 15.3
1993 13.8 11.5 2,364 206 17.1
1995 16.4 11.6 3,012 260 18.4
1997 15.0 11.9 3,255 274 21.7
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Child Support and Alimony (various years); U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, Child Support for Custodial Mothers and Fathers (various years); U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (various years).port awards would yield added support payments (Bishop 1992). Cases
that were not modiﬁed for the last three years were reviewed and, where
appropriate, modiﬁed in about 15 percent of AFDC cases reviewed and 6
percent of non-AFDC cases. The total cost of the eﬀort amounted to about
$1.5 million, while the added government savings from oﬀsetting beneﬁts
against the higher support payments reached about $4.6 million.
In examining the high and rising cost of the CSE program in relation to
support payments, one must bear in mind that, as noted above, the mix of
custodial mothers has shifted from married and divorced mothers toward
never-married mothers, the latter of whom are more costly to serve than
the former.
Finally, the collections data overlook the CSE program’s most impres-
sive achievement—the sharp rise in the establishment of paternity. As of
the mid-1980s, births to unmarried women amounted to about 850,000,
and only about 240,000 paternities were being established that year, result-
ing in one paternity establishment for every three and a half nonmarital
births.6 Fortunately, the CSE system has made such enormous progress in
paternity establishment that as of 1997, there were slightly more paternities
established or acknowledged (1.29 million) than births to unmarried
women (1.28 million).7 Since paternities can be established for children
born outside marriage in past years and since the accumulated stock of po-
tential paternity cases is far higher than annual nonmarital births, annual
paternities can easily exceed annual nonmarital births for several years to
come.
9.8 Trends in State and Federal Financing of Administrative Costs
Together with providing enforcement tools and mandating policies, the
federal government contributed substantially to the funding of state child
support programs. The administrative matching incentive payments are
complex, but states typically receive 66 percent of the normal administra-
tive costs as well as 90 percent of the costs of laboratory blood testing. A sec-
ond component of state funds comes from the recovered child support pay-
ments made on behalf of welfare recipients that are kept by the government
to recoup its costs of providing welfare. The recovered payments are divided
between the federal and state government based on the matching percent-
Child Support 609
6. Our estimate of births to unmarried mothers is from Vital Statistics, which collects its
data from the states. A few states identify nonmarital births by comparing the mother’s last
name to that of the father’s last name. If they are diﬀerent or there is no last name for the fa-
ther, the state assumes that the mother is unmarried, which overstates the number of unwed
births.
7. There may be double-counting of paternities established because both hospitals and
child support oﬃces count paternities and child support oﬃces do not necessarily eliminate
the overlap between these two sources before submitting their reports to the state child sup-
port agency.age used for Medicaid, which had been the AFDC matching rate before the
block grant was introduced. Low-income states like Mississippi, which re-
ceived an 80 percent federal match, must return 80 percent of collections to
the federal government. High-payment states split the collections on a ﬁfty-
ﬁfty basis. A third source is federal incentive payments that provide states
with additional funds that can add up to as much as 10 percent of collec-
tions. Congress recently changed the basis on which these funds are dis-
tributed (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1997b).
In ﬁscal year 1996, states received from the federal government a com-
bined sum of about $2 billion in direct administrative matching payments
and $400 million in incentive payments. Total administrative expenses, in-
cluding the $600 million net contribution by states, amounted to about $3
billion. Since states claimed about $1 billion of the collections, they ended
up netting about $400 million under CSE. In table 9.7, we can see the
trends in the size of the administrative costs and of the amounts recovered
and retained by the state and federal governments. Note that the real dol-
lar gains of states from CSE have remained constant despite much more
rapid increases in total administrative costs than in recovered contribu-
tions. Through 1984, combined (federal and state) recovered collections
actually exceeded combined administrative costs. By 1996, the balance had
shifted to the point at which combined administrative costs exceeded re-
covered collections by about $1.1 billion. In that year, the federal govern-
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Table 9.7 Federal and State Spending on Administrative Costs and Federal and State
Collections Recovered: 1978–98 ($1996 millions)
Net Federal Federal Share Net Federal Net State State Share Net State
Administrative of Collected Government Administrative of Collected Government
Outlays Child Support Cost Outlays Child Support Cost
1978 708 759 –51 54 361 –307
1980 821 480 341 88 534 –447
1982 923 507 416 75 577 –502
1984 968 607 361 124 677 –553
1986 1,123 524 599 213 602 –389
1988 1,365 597 767 192 698 –507
1990 1,603 645 958 340 750 –410
1991 1,714 720 994 362 805 –443
1992 1,839 827 1,013 395 881 –486
1993 2,005 839 1,165 416 915 –499
1994 2,277 808 1,469 434 944 –511
1995 2,570 846 1,724 533 967 –435
1996 2,449 888 1,561 606 1,013 –407
1997 2,675 1,023 1,652 676 1,132 457
1998 2,677 924 1,753 773 1,048 275
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (2000).
Note: The net federal outlays include incentive payments to state governments; the net state outlays
equal state administrative expenditures less federal incentive payments.ment bore not only this $1.1 billion net cost, but also another $400 million
in net state receipts.
These state surpluses, however, may be a thing of the past as incentive
funding shifts and welfare caseloads decline (Turetsky 1998). By 1998, net
federal costs had increased to $1.8 billion, while the dollar gain to states
had declined $275 million. Since the fall of 2000, incentive funding has
been capped, and states have been competing for a limited amount of
money. In addition, the amount of income generated from cost recovery
has stagnated as welfare caseloads have fallen. Just as revenue is stagnat-
ing, demand for child support services continues to increase and may well
accelerate now that welfare is time-limited. This tension in the ﬁnancial
structure of the child support system is clearly evident on Capitol Hill as
well as across the country.
9.9 Eﬀects of Child Support Incentives on Behavior
The empirical evidence documents the role of the CSE system in raising
child support payments. Given the fact that the CSE program is not a pa-
per tiger and actually adds to collections, we might expect to observe be-
havioral eﬀects on such outcomes as the labor supply of custodial parents
and noncustodial parents, welfare use, nonmarital childbearing, divorce
and remarriage, and the involvement of noncustodial parents in raising
their children. In general, theory does not yield ﬁrm predictions on how
child support enforcement aﬀects each of these behaviors. Moreover, in-
centive eﬀects on one behavior may be oﬀset or reinforced by eﬀects on
another behavior. If, for example, stricter CSE enforcement were to en-
courage custodial mothers on welfare to go to work, the increased inde-
pendence of single mothers might reduce their probability of marriage or
remarriage (Hu 1999, 78).
Although the empirical strategies naturally vary depending on the be-
havior examined, several authors identify policy impacts by regressing vari-
ations across states and over time in CSE policies on a behavioral outcome.
The ﬁrst problem is obtaining accurate measures of the implementation of
policies. For example, states whose guidelines require unusually high child
support awards may ﬁnd that judges deﬁne income less comprehensively
than in other states. A second problem is the simultaneity of policies and
behavioral outcomes. If, for example, high nonmarital birth rates stimulate
stronger paternity establishment eﬀorts, then estimates may show paternity
establishment eﬀort increasing rather than reducing the rate of nonmarital
births. Untangling the short-run and long-run eﬀects of policies poses an-
other serious estimation problem. Policies that increase the state’s eﬀec-
tiveness in establishing paternity may reduce nonmarital childbearing, but
only after expectations of potential mothers and fathers change.
Ideally, one would like to follow how CSE changes the constraints faced
by each individual, which, in turn, change child support payments or re-
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pacts of CSE from state and over time variation, the focus is sometimes on
the eﬀects of actual child support payments or receipts by individuals on
their work, welfare status, marital status, and parental involvement. This
strategy would be appropriate if actual payments or receipts were better in-
dicators of the impact of CSE than estimates derived from cross-section
and time series estimates. Unfortunately, it is not easy to isolate the eﬀect
of child support on an individual basis because unmeasured characteristics
plausibly aﬀect child support payments and other outcomes. A noncusto-
dial father who cares for his children and trusts their mother is more likely
to both work hard and make support payments than another father with
the identical observable characteristics.
Several strategies have emerged to deal with these issues. One is to use a
comparison group methodology. The idea is that variation and changes in
state CSE policies should only aﬀect groups potentially aﬀected by such
policies. For example, by examining how state policy variables aﬀect the
work eﬀort of noncustodial fathers compared to the work eﬀort of custo-
dial fathers (or single nonfathers), Freeman and Waldfogel (1998) attempt
to take account of any spurious relationship between state policies and the
supply of labor. Nixon (1996) uses estimates of CSE variables on married
women without children as a quasi–control group in an analysis of CSE’s
eﬀects on divorce. This approach is worthwhile but fails to capture the po-
tential simultaneity between the child support situation and state policies.
If low work eﬀort and low support payments by noncustodial fathers stim-
ulated states to adopt tough collection policies, then CSE policies might ap-
pear to be reducing work eﬀort even in the absence of such an impact. To
deal with this problem, some researchers model the state policies as a func-
tion of factors exogenous to the child support situation in the state. Using a
two-stage least squares procedure, Case (1998) estimates a ﬁrst-stage equa-
tion of paternity enforcement policies as a function of the gender composi-
tion of the state legislature, on the grounds that women legislators will have
a deeper interest in eﬀective child support enforcement. The second stage
involves regressing state paternity policies on out-of-wedlock childbearing.
Still another approach is to use state policies as instrumental variables in
equations estimating the eﬀects of individual child support receipts or pay-
ments on behavior. This method bases estimates on the indirect eﬀects of
policy operating through individual payments or receipts. Such an ap-
proach is particularly useful when the child support eﬀects operate
through complex budget constraints. Finally, a few social experiments have
tested interventions to increase child support payments.
9.9.1 Eﬀects of Child Support Incentives and Employment Services on
Child Support Collections
Policymakers have funded experiments to test the impacts of eﬀorts to
improve the weak incentives and limited capacity of noncustodial fathers
612 Robert I. Lerman and Elaine Sorensento pay child support. In the W-2 Child Support Demonstration in Wiscon-
sin, parents on welfare and in the treatment group were allowed to retain
the full amount of child support paid on behalf of their children while con-
trol group parents could only keep the higher of $50 per month or 41 per-
cent of the support paid by noncustodial parents. Meyer and Cancian
(2001) found that the enhanced incentives raised the share of fathers pay-
ing support by 2–3 percentage points (from a base of about 50 percent) and
the level of total support payments by about 5 percent. The eﬀects varied
substantially among subgroups, with the largest impacts taking place
among fathers divorced from their children’s mothers, fathers with a recent
history of paying child support, and mothers with no recent history on wel-
fare. Although the increased incentive to pay and to receive child support
stimulated support payments, the treatment induced no signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the work eﬀort of noncustodial fathers, their involvement with their
children, or the earnings of mothers.
The PFS demonstration used employment services, peer support
groups, mediation, and improved linkages with the child support system to
increase child support payments by noncustodial fathers as well as to raise
their earnings and involvement with their children. The participants were
men whose children were on AFDC, who were behind in their support
payments, and who were unemployed or underemployed. Although the
PFS intervention raised formal child support payments by about 25 per-
cent (from $313 to $397 over a six-month period), 44 percent of the in-
crease came from reductions in informal support (Knox and Redcross
2000). Estimates of the eﬀects of PFS on fathers’ earnings vary with the
sample and data set. Using the full sample and information from unem-
ployment insurance wage records, one ﬁnds little evidence of PFS-induced
gain in earnings. However, data from a sample of fathers interviewed for
the study suggest positive PFS impacts on earnings of over 20 percent
(Martinez and Miller 2000).
The experimental results show that incentives and services can aﬀect
both the ability and the willingness of low-income noncustodial parents to
pay child support. However, determining the size of the eﬀects and which
interventions work best will require additional research and demonstra-
tion activity.
9.9.2 Child Support and Work Eﬀort by Custodial and
Noncustodial Parents
Economic theory predicts that child support income, like other nonem-
ployment income, should have a negative impact on the work eﬀort of cus-
todial parents. However, as the labor-leisure budget constraint in ﬁgure 9.2
illustrates, the interaction between child support and welfare programs
complicates the analysis. In the absence of any welfare beneﬁts, the pres-
ence of child support income simply raises nonemployment income and
plausibly exerts a negative income eﬀect on work. But when the custodial
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of child support has no eﬀect on the amount of nonemployment. As long
as welfare payments are positive (net of child support), child support in-
come should have no income or substitution eﬀect. Child support can be-
come a factor encouraging work eﬀort over some ranges because it lowers
the point at which custodial parents leave welfare and thus are no longer
subject to the high marginal tax rates from welfare programs. A custodial
parent choosing whether not to work or to work enough to move beyond
point B will be more likely to work if child support is available. The pres-
ence of child support thus raises the net return to work for custodial par-
ents, at least in a segment of earnings, and should reduce the size of welfare
payments and the amount of welfare received.
In a recent paper, Hu (1999) ﬁnds that, as predicted, increases in child
support payments reduce welfare participation and reduce work eﬀort
among nonwelfare mothers but raise labor force participation among all
divorced mothers. Added child support also slows the rate of remarriage.
Hu develops an elaborate six-equation model estimated with joint maxi-
mum likelihood techniques. The ﬁrst three equations estimate how child
support and other factors aﬀect hours of work while on welfare, hours of
work oﬀwelfare, and whether the custodial parent works while oﬀwelfare.
A fourth equation determines whether the custodial mother chooses to
participate on welfare. The ﬁfth is a hazard function yielding potential im-
pacts of child support on remarriage, and the sixth is a child support equa-
tion that embodies the role of child support policies as well as other vari-
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Fig. 9.2 Interaction between child support and welfareables presumably exogenous to the mother’s work and marriage behavior.
Hu uses ﬁve years of data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) on women with children under eighteen who divorced or separated
and became heads of households between 1969 and 1987.
Hu’s ﬁndings show that the additional work stimulated by child support
comes about through its impact on reducing AFDC use. Both for those
who remain on AFDC and for those not on AFDC, child support lowers
labor supply. The impact of additional child support varies depending on
which mothers receive the money. One simulation raises amounts paid to
mothers already receiving support and assumes modest payments to moth-
ers not receiving any support. This change would raise child support in-
come from $2,516 to $4,221, reduce welfare participation from 20 to 15
percent, increase the proportion working from 76 to 79 percent, and raise
average hours worked from 1,311 to 1,403.
In an earlier analysis, Graham and Beller (1989) found that the total
eﬀect of child support payments on labor force participation of divorced
mothers was negative, but exceedingly small. They estimated that a $1,000
increase in child support reduced work by just two hours. Their estimated
eﬀect of child support on welfare participation was similar to that of Hu
(1999).
Evidence from the New York Child Assistant Program (CAP) reinforces
the idea that substituting child support or a child support–like payment for
welfare can raise the earnings of single mothers (Hamilton et al. 1996). The
CAP payment went to mothers who had support orders but could not col-
lect from noncustodial fathers. The payment declined only at a 10 percent
rate on earnings up to the poverty line, but it fell at a sharp 67 percent on
earnings above the poverty line. Using a random assignment experimental
design, the evaluators found that CAP raised earnings by 20 percent over
ﬁve years, increasing both hours worked and the proportion working. The
gain in the share working was about 3 percentage points, as the share that
was working rose from 26 percent among controls to 29 percent among the
treatment group.
In addition, it should be noted that work incentives for custodial parents
are further complicated in states that use income-shares guidelines. In gen-
eral, the custodial parent faces no decrease in the marginal gain from work-
ing, but in states that have an income-share model of determining child
support awards that declines with income, additional earnings to the cus-
todial parent will, by placing the income in a lower rate bracket, reduce the
amount owed by the noncustodial parent. Consider an income-share state
in which the required contribution starts at 25 percent of joint income
through $40,000 and then drops by 1 percentage point per $5,000 until
joint income reaches $80,000. Suppose further that the income of the non-
custodial parents is constant at $30,000 per year. As the custodial parent
raises her income from $10,000 per year to $20,000, she loses $600, for an
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plied to joint income increases with income will work in the opposite di-
rection.
For noncustodial parents, most guidelines embody rules that raise pay-
ment obligations as income increases. If the noncustodial parent does not
beneﬁt at all from these additional payments (say, by gaining utility from
the knowledge that his child has more resources because of his contribu-
tions), then payments under a percentage of income or income-shares
guideline act like an income tax, with oﬀsetting income and substitution
eﬀects on work.
However, although most awards are set as a nominal dollar amount that
reﬂects the noncustodial parent’s ability to pay child support at that time,
only about one-quarter of the orders are ever modiﬁed to reﬂect changes in
income or circumstances. Thus, changes in obligations do not materialize
immediately after an income change, and since they sometimes take a long
time, a noncustodial parent may view his or her payment as a ﬁxed sum, a
sum that exerts an income but no substitution eﬀect. But, as Freeman and
Waldfolgel (1998) point out, if the noncustodial parent can avoid this levy
by engaging in self-employment, casual work, or oﬀ-the-books work, or by
“disappearing” to some other locale, there may be a huge substitution
eﬀect in work activity, away from wage and salary employment to less read-
ily observable activities.
Freeman and Waldfolgel (1998) ﬁnd that child support policies had
little, if any, eﬀect on noncustodial fathers’ labor supply, which is consis-
tent with the general ﬁnding in male labor supply studies that male labor
supply is relatively unresponsive to variations in wages. As best as they
could tell, noncustodial fathers in states with stronger CSE policies were
slightly more likely to be working relative to custodial fathers and slightly
less likely to be working oﬀ the books. Their ﬁndings come from regres-
sions in which state CSE policies are determinants of work eﬀort by non-
custodial parents. By interacting the CSE policy variables with the proba-
bility that a man is a noncustodial father, the coeﬃcients reﬂect the
diﬀerence between CSE eﬀects on noncustodial fathers and the potentially
spurious eﬀects of CSE on custodial fathers and/or men with no children.
The data come from the 1986 and 1991 Surveys of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). Although CSE was not as rigorous in those years as
it is today, especially among low-income noncustodial fathers, Freeman
and Waldfogel do ﬁnd large positive eﬀects of wage-withholding on the
payments of never-married fathers. Thus, at this point, there is no evidence
that CSE reduces the amount worked by noncustodial parents.
Noncustodial parents with children on welfare have even less to gain
from paying child support. With their payments simply oﬀsetting govern-
ment aid, noncustodial parents may well perceive no beneﬁt from paying
support. As noted above, in this case, the income-conditioned support ob-
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duction to the net wage can easily become substantial: A noncustodial par-
ent with two children and earning $18,000 per year will owe over $5,000 per
year (about 29 percent of income) in child support in the median state
(Pirog, Klotz, and Byers 1998). Add payroll taxes (7 percent) and the low-
est income tax class (15 percent), and you have a marginal tax rate of 52
percent.
Even when mothers leave welfare, noncustodial fathers may still pay
most of their support to the government for back welfare or Medicaid costs
or for arrearages built up during the period in which their children received
welfare. At the moment, there are no studies that provide an analysis of the
marginal tax rates that noncustodial parents face with respect to child sup-
port alone or with respect to cumulative rates that incorporate child sup-
port, taxes, and transfers.
9.9.3 Child Support Impacts on Nonmarital Births, Divorce,
Remarriage, Father Involvement
Several studies have examined the impact of child support enforcement
on nonmarital child bearing, divorce, remarriage, and father involvement.
In general, policies that require noncustodial parents to assume greater ﬁ-
nancial responsibility for raising their children potentially increase the in-
dependence of custodial parents, but they also increase the cost of family
formation and dissolution for noncustodial parents.
Recent research on the impact of child support on divorce suggests that
child support enforcement discourages divorce, especially among mothers
most likely to be eligible for welfare assistance. Nixon (1997) ﬁnds robust
evidence that tighter child support enforcement lowers the rate of divorce.
Apparently, the CSE-induced disincentive for fathers was enough to out-
weigh the CSE impact on independence. Using marital history informa-
tion from the 1988 and 1990 March/April Current Population Surveys,
Nixon estimates the probability of divorce within a ﬁve-year period, given
that a marriage had taken place by the survey year. The key independent
variables are ﬁve state child support enforcement variables representing
the policy climate and state eﬀectiveness in collections. As noted, Nixon
takes account of spurious relationships between policies and outcomes by
using married mothers with no children as a quasi–control group. The CSE
variables exert no eﬀect on these women, making the negative CSE impacts
on divorce among mothers more convincing. The eﬀects are larger among
low-income mothers, perhaps because the existence of welfare programs
means that CSE provides little additional independence but does create
disincentives for fathers.
With regard to remarriage, it appears that increased child support en-
forcement has resulted in lower remarriage rates among custodial and non-
custodial parents. Increased child support leads to greater independence
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them (Beller and Graham 1993; Yun 1992; and Hu 1999). On the other
hand, Bloom, Conrad, and Miller (1998) ﬁnd that increased child support
enforcement leads to increased costs to noncustodial parents, which, in
turn, reduces their likelihood of remarriage. This analysis compares the
impact of CSE variables on the rate of remarriage among divorced men
with children as compared to divorced men without children. Using the
SIPP and the NLSY79, the authors estimate that an increase in the collec-
tion rate from the thirtieth to the tenth ranked state reduces the yearly haz-
ard of remarriage by 28–31 percent. Extending the time to remarriage does
not, however, appear to improve the quality of marital matches. Bloom,
Conrad, and Miller also investigate the potential impacts of CSE on the en-
try into ﬁrst marriage among men who fathered nonmarital children and
on the probability of a second nonmarital birth. The results suggest little
or no impact of CSE on these behaviors.
Several recent studies have examined the relationship between child sup-
port enforcement and nonmarital childbearing. As mentioned earlier, the
expected eﬀect of increased child support on nonmarital childbearing is
ambiguous—stronger child support enforcement increases the cost of
nonmarital fatherhood, but it also increases the independence of nonmar-
ital motherhood. In general, results from these studies suggest that in-
creased child support enforcement reduces nonmarital childbearing. Case
(1998) provides a two-stage model in which state paternity enforcement
policies are determinants of nonmarital births but are endogenous and are
identiﬁed using the number of women in the state legislatures and other ex-
ogenous state characteristics. The estimates cover variations across states
and over time from 1978 through 1991. The two-stage approach turns out
to make a major diﬀerence in outcomes. The simple ordinary least squares
regressions of state policies on nonmarital childbearing yield no negative
impacts, but in the two-stage model, CSE policies consistently exert signif-
icant, negative impacts.
An analysis by Plotnick et al. (1999) attempts to determine whether
strict CSE enforcement inﬂuenced the likelihood that women had a pre-
marital birth as a teenager. The authors follow the fertility and marital his-
tory through age twenty of a sample of 2,153 women, ages fourteen to six-
teen in 1979, drawn from the NLSY. Controlling for an array of individual
and area characteristics, the regressions relate state rates of paternity es-
tablishment, state collections per case, and state collections per adminis-
trative dollar to the probability of teen premarital childbearing. Although
paternity establishment rates do exert a negative impact, the main speciﬁ-
cation shows only statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on white women, none for
black women. Still, the authors project that raising state performance on
paternity establishment from existing levels to the rates achieved by the
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births by more than 50 percent, from 11.5 to 5.5 percent.
The connection between child support payments and visitation by non-
custodial parents is often a contentious issue. Some fathers’ rights groups
claim that although public agencies go to great lengths to enforce the pay-
ment obligations of noncustodial parents, the government shows little in-
terest in making sure that the visitation rights of noncustodial parents are
upheld (Pearson and Thoennes 1998). One worry is that strict CSE poli-
cies, by driving fathers to work longer hours or to leave the state to avoid
making payments, could weaken contact between noncustodial parents
and their children. On the other hand, as eﬀective policies push noncusto-
dial parents to make payments, these parents may see themselves as having
more of a stake in their child’s life and more of an earned right to partici-
pate in raising the child. Seltzer, McLanahan, and Hanson (1998) examine
the eﬀect of child support on the involvement of fathers and on the conﬂict
between parents using data from the 1987–88 and the 1992–94 NSFH. The
authors use a sample of 1,300 families with a child eligible for child support
as of 1987 and a small longitudinal sample of children whose parents were
married in wave 1 and separated or divorced between waves 1 and 2. The
raw data show that child support payments are positively associated with
both visitations and with conﬂict between parents. To test for CSE eﬀects,
the authors regress state CSE variables on visitation and conﬂict and also
use state CSE variables as instruments in regressions of child support pay-
ments on outcomes. Some CSE practices raised the extent of visitation by
fathers, although the eﬀects were not statistically signiﬁcant in the instru-
mental variable analyses. At the same time, higher child support payments,
including payments induced by tighter enforcement, heightened parental
conﬂict in the analyses using instrumental variables.
The fact that welfare programs cause support payments to go to the gov-
ernment instead of one’s child could well add to the disincentive associated
with family splitting. A noncustodial parent could realize that if he sepa-
rates from his children and they go on welfare, he will have to pay child sup-
port and little, if any, of his support will beneﬁt his children, which may
cause him to be marginalized in his children’s lives. Of course, given the dis-
incentives of both parents to channel money through the formal system
and report payments to welfare programs, noncustodial parents could
make payments informally and custodial parents could avoid reporting
them (Edin and Lein 1997). In this case, the support would end up raising
the child’s family income (Bassi and Lerman 1996). However, noncustodial
parents would have to bear the penalty of limiting their job choices to the
informal sector indeﬁnitely or would face the prospect of having to make
back payments; custodial parents would have to commit welfare fraud by
not cooperating with CSE agencies.
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Certainly, several equity issues are involved in the setting of child sup-
port awards. Betson, Evenhouse, and Reilly (1992) examine the trade-oﬀ
between equity and incentives embedded in alternative methods of setting
awards. They ﬁnd that, when the incomes of noncustodial parents are sub-
stantially higher than the incomes of custodial parents, the standard ap-
proaches used in state guidelines cause the custodial parent and children to
suﬀer large declines in living standards relative to the predivorce incomes,
whereas noncustodial parents living alone typically gain. However, mov-
ing to formulas that do more to equalize living standards raises marginal
tax rates on noncustodial parents substantially.
Custody and visitation issues complicate considerations of the equity of
child support. A parent may willingly trade the loss of income in order to
retain custody of his or her child. In this context, making the parent who is
not granted custody pay child support punishes the loser and thus may
weaken the equity case for large support payments, especially since pay-
ments to the custodial parent cannot be monitored to assure that they
mainly beneﬁt the child. Another complication arises when parents who
provide partial custody do not receive credit for their in-kind contribu-
tions.
A frequent complaint of noncustodial parents is the state’s lack of inter-
est in enforcing their visitation rights with the same vigor as their eﬀorts to
collect child support. Congress recently acknowledged the problem when
it enacted in 1996 a small grant program under the Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) to facilitate ac-
cess and visitation by noncustodial parents, through such mechanisms
as mediation, counseling, education, parenting plans, and monitoring and
supervision of visits. Although most states received only about $50,000–
200,000 under the program in 1997, they established 131 programs and
served about 20,000 people (U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices 1999).
Finally, there are the inequities in the establishment of payment obliga-
tions for low-income fathers (Sorensen and Lerman 1998). To an unknown
extent, judges set support obligations on the basis of expectations of a cus-
todial parent’s income, even when such income is out of reach. In addition,
some states charge fathers for the cost of the delivery of the child and for
welfare payments, even when these charges are much higher than the non-
custodial parent would owe if the guidelines were followed. Low-income
fathers often lack the knowledge of how to have their payments adjusted
during periods of unemployment and incarceration. Once the orders are
established, the federal Bradley amendment of 1986 prohibits judges from
forgiving past-due support, called arrearages. Moreover, arrearages can-
not be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding, even when the amounts
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contributions to their children that are not taken into account when they
face legal proceedings. According to Waller and Plotnick (1999), the in-
kind contributions are accepted by the community and the custodial par-
ent but are ignored by the CSE system. In some cases, fathers must even
pay back child support for periods in which they were living with and sup-
porting their children.
The inﬂexibility of the CSE system in dealing with low-income fathers
may contribute to driving many such fathers into the underground econ-
omy. Although one quantitative analysis ﬁnds little evidence of a child
support–induced decline in legitimate earnings of nonresident fathers
(Freeman and Waldfogel 1998), the data were far from ideal and eﬀects on
underground earnings are consistently reported in the qualitative literature
(Johnson, Levine, and Doolittle 1999; Waller and Plotnick 1999).
The diﬀerences between tax and transfer policies in the treatment of
child support also weaken the noncustodial parent’s incentive to make pay-
ments. The tax system does not permit the noncustodial parent to deduct
child support, but it does exclude child support from the mother’s income
(Wheaton and Sorensen 1998b). In contrast, child support is typically
counted as income to the recipient in determining transfer beneﬁts, but at
least in the case of food stamps, noncustodial parents can deduct support
payments from countable income. The problem arises when the custodial
parent receives welfare beneﬁts while the noncustodial parent does not and
is subject to income taxes. In this case, the payer (noncustodial parent) can-
not take the payments as deductions, yet the receiver must count the pay-
ments as income.
One can look at child support’s treatment in the transfer system from
two perspectives. Some policymakers have argued for exempting all or part
of child support from income counted in transfer programs. Such a policy
would face the problem of horizontal equity because families with similar
incomes but diﬀerent income sources (say, one with earnings and one with
child support income) would be treated diﬀerently. On the other hand,
since the individual earning the income to pay child support would already
have been taxed on the receipt of that income, counting payments in the in-
come of recipients would amount to a kind of double taxation.
9.11 Critical Reform Options
In one sense, child support should have a bright future. The CSE pro-
grams have all the tools they need to establish paternity, establish appro-
priate support awards, and collect payments. The declining welfare case-
loads are reducing the number of families exposed to perverse incentives
under which noncustodial parents see their hard-earned payments going,
not to their children, but to reimbursing the government, and neither par-
Child Support 621ent has a stake in having support payments ﬂow through oﬃcial channels.
For many parents, these trends do augur well for the future. But for the
many low-income fathers with large arrearages, too many of the familiar
disincentives remain in place. Some may face past obligations that loom so
large as to discourage all but the most motivated.
Although no national reports are available that document the distribu-
tional impact of arrearages, there is enough state-speciﬁc evidence to stim-
ulate calls for reforms (Roberts 2001). The federal government has made it
clear that states can forgive arrears owed to the government. Some states
are now forgiving arrears owed to them in exchange for full compliance
with present and future obligations. However, the underlying causes of the
large arrearages owed to the government are not fully understood and need
to be identiﬁed.
Child Support Assurance (CSA), a widely discussed reform proposed by
Irwin Garﬁnkel and others, would require that noncustodial parents make
payments according to speciﬁed guidelines (Garﬁnkel, McLanahan, and
Robins 1992; Roberts 1994).8 In cases where the noncustodial parent was
unable to pay or the government was unable to collect the payments, the
government would provide an assured payment not conditioned on the in-
come of the custodial parent. If the nonresident parent paid some amount
less than the assured beneﬁt, the program would pay the diﬀerence. Given
the very low incomes of many noncustodial parents, many custodial par-
ents are bound to receive minimal or highly varying support payments.
Such instability weakens the ability of single parents to package enough in-
come through earnings and other sources outside welfare to make ends
meet. The CSA could smooth the payments custodial parents are due from
the contribution of the other parent. Counting CSA beneﬁts as income
would lower the welfare break-even point and thus raise the likelihood
that families earn their way oﬀ income-tested public assistance. From
Garﬁnkel’s (1994) perspective, CSA would extend the social insurance
concept now embodied in Survivors Insurance to children who suﬀer in-
come losses due to the absence of a parent.
Although an assured beneﬁt is appealing, the program would extend to
other groups the disincentive problem in welfare under which support pay-
ments do very little to raise the living standard of the children. As in the
welfare case, the presence of assured beneﬁts would reduce the incentives
for many noncustodial parents to make payments and for many custodial
parents to pursue delinquent parents.
The costs and impacts of a CSA program would vary substantially with
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8. The National Commission on Children (1991) recommended adopting a child support
assurance program. Federal legislation has been introduced several times to implement some
form of child support assurance, but these eﬀorts have never been enacted. Several states,
such as California, are currently experimenting with the concept. Several European countries
implement the CSA concept under Advanced Maintenance programs.the level of the assured beneﬁt and the group of custodial parents covered.
According to Sorensen and Clark (1994), a payment of $1,500 per year per
child in 1989 limited to families with a support award would have cost
about $1.6 billion and reduced child poverty by 0.6 percent. Extending the
CSA to all custodial families would have quadrupled the cost to $7 billion
and would have lifted 3 percent of poor children out of poverty. Meyer et
al. (1994) make estimates for 1985 of alternative CSA plans that take ac-
count of labor supply responses by custodial parents. They ﬁnd the costs,
antipoverty eﬀects, and labor supply eﬀects are modest for low payment
plans limited to families with awards. Only if the CSA stimulated improve-
ments in award levels and in the proportion receiving an award would the
CSA approach substantially increase the labor supply of recipients of Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families and reduce the poverty gap.
One experimental program similar to a CSA, New York’s CAP, was
available in seven counties to custodial parents eligible to receive AFDC in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The assured beneﬁt under CAP was set be-
low the AFDC guarantee but above the average level of actual child sup-
port payments. However, because payments under CAP declined only by
10 percent of income up to the poverty line and by 67 percent of income
above the poverty line, CAP dominated AFDC for mothers with earnings
of $350 or more per month. At the same time, CAP was income-tested and
limited to welfare-eligible families, unlike proposals for CSA. Another
diﬀerence was CAP’s provision of case management and employment ser-
vices outside of AFDC. To determine the impacts of CAP, researchers
studied the child support, employment, and welfare use of families ran-
domly assigned to the CAP treatment and to a control group (Burstein
and Werner 1994). They found that CAP generated a signiﬁcant increase
in child support awards (rising from 7.6 to 12 percent of participants) but
not actual support payments, and signiﬁcant increases in employment and
earnings, but only modest gains in family income. Still, the changes in work
incentives induced enough increased earnings to raise family incomes and
save government resources at the same time. Family income rose by a mod-
est $850 over ﬁve years while government spending saved $2,366 over the
same period (Hamilton et al. 1996).
9.12 Conclusions
Child support enforcement has become an increasingly important func-
tion of our income support system for low-income families. Although the
real costs of the CSE program are substantial—federal and state govern-
ments spend over $4 billion in administrative costs—so are the beneﬁts.
Already, nearly 30 percent of poor unmarried mothers receive a child sup-
port payment. As fewer low-income single parents remain on welfare, the
incentives for custodial parents to receive support and for noncustodial
Child Support 623parents to pay will rise substantially. Although it is not enough to provide
basic support for families, child support can play a critical role in supple-
menting the incomes of low-income single parents and their children.
Child support payments can be part of an income packaging strategy that
includes earnings, the Earned Income Tax Credit, food stamps, child care
subsidies, and Medicaid or subsidized health insurance. Until recently, low
rates of paternity establishment (below 30 percent of nonmarital births)
limited collections on behalf of the poorest group of single mothers, never-
married mothers. But in the last few years, the CSE system has made great
strides in raising rates of paternity establishment. The increase in paternity
establishment not only is critical for expanding child support payments
to the lowest-income families, but may even be discouraging nonmarital
births.
Still, child support enforcement has a long way to go. One major prob-
lem is how to deal with arrearages facing low-income fathers subject to
child support obligations. Without changes in policy, many low-income fa-
thers will see their support payments going to the state for arrearages in-
stead of helping raise living standards of their children. Parents will ﬁnd
themselves with the same disincentives experienced under the welfare sys-
tem. In addition, the CSE system must ﬁnd fairer ways to take account of
the low income levels and high income instability of many noncustodial
parents. Finally, given the greater acceptance of an expanded CSE, Con-
gress should consider expanding the federal government’s role in resolving
the critical equity issues of visitation and access.
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